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convicting him of a lesser included offense, cannot render an acceptable
verdict in line with the laws of Florida.29
CHARLEs KANTOR
IMPLIED WARRANTY: DISCLAIMER INEFFECTIVE
Plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer and retail dealer
alleging breach of express and implied warranties and demanding return
of the purchase price of a "lemon" automobile. The trial court granted
final summary judgment for the manufacturer based upon a lack of priv-
ity and the disclaimer of warranties contained in the contract of sale.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed, per curiam. On
certification to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed and re-
manded: An action may be maintained against a manufacturer notwith-
standing a lack of privity.' Furthermore, the terms of the contract of sale
do not operate to disclaim implied warranties. There is no sound reason
for distinguishing between liability for personal injury and economic
loss on these issues,2 and liability is particularly warranted where the
manufacturer uses mass advertising to market his product.3 Manheim v.
Ford Motor Co., 201 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
29. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in the recent case of Little v. State, 206
So.2d 9 (Fla. 1968). The Court held that where the lower court in a robbery prosecution
found that the crime of robbery had been proved, the defendant was entitled to an instruction
on the lesser included offense of larceny.
1. Except for the advertising rationale, this issue will not be noted because it was al-
ready well established in Florida that lack of privity did not bar an implied warranty action
against a manufacturer. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966);
Power Ski, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 188 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). See also Engel v.
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 198 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (warranty coverage
still limited to users of the product).
2. A well-developed discussion of this point may be found in Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), reversing 82 N.J. Super. 319, 197 A.2d
589 (App. Div. 1964).
3. It should be emphasized that the decision went on to only discuss the manufacturer's
liability under implied warranties. The court did not hold that the mass advertising created
either an express or implied warranty. The failure to clearly state what express warranty
liability existed or to distinguish between express and implied warranty liability considerably
clouded the opinion.
Some jurisdictions have used mass advertising by the manufacturer as a rationale for
eliminating the privity requirement in implied warranty actions. Hamon v. Digliani, 148
Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1964) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) ; Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d
337 (1967); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); Jacob E. Decker &
Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
Other jurisdictions have held that mass advertising creates an express warranty upon
which the ultimate buyer may bring an action. Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96,
36 S.W.2d 859 (1931) ; Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253
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Over a century and a half ago Lord Ellenborough thundered that,
"The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them upon a dung-
hill."4 The implied warranty is the law's recognition of this self-evident
fact. An implied warranty arises by operation of law, irrespective of the
intention of the seller,' and exists to protect the consumer from defects
which he has neither the capacity nor the opportunity to detect." Because
the warranty is implied as an incident to the contract of sale, an integra-
tion clause does not preclude its implication.7
A disclaimer is a contractual provision by which the buyer and the
seller negate the implication of the warranty." Traditionally, courts al-
lowed the parties to the contract to disclaim all implied warranties.9 Such
disclaimers are becoming more and more prevalent in modern society
because lack of privity no longer effectively immunizes the manufacturer
from liability. However, concomitant with the judicial assault upon the
citadel of privity is the rising judicial assault upon the bastion of the dis-
claimer. Courts today commonly refuse to give full effect to purported
disclaimers by declaring them to be too ambiguous, by refusing to enforce
them when they are not sufficiently brought to the buyer's attention and
by using the "displacement theory."
The courts that have refused to enforce disclaimers because they
were found to be ambiguous believe that the buyer cannot reasonably per-
ceive what he is giving up.'0 For example, it is doubtful that the average
buyer, upon reading the standard automobile warranty, realizes that he
is absolving the manufacturer from all warranty liability for personal
S.W.2d 532 (1952) ; Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) ; Inglis
v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) ; General Motors Corp.
v. Dodson, 48 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash.
456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
At least two jurisdictions have held that mass advertising creates an implied warranty in
favor of the ultimate buyer. Huscher v. Pfost, 122 Colo. 301, 221 P.2d 931 (1950) ; Miller v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So.2d 409 (La. Ct. App. 1954). However, at least one court has
held it to be applicable only to an express warranty action. Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
4. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B. 1815).
5. Berger v. E. Berger & Co., 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918).
6. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenland
Dev. Corp. v. Allied Heating Prods. Co., 184 Va. 588, 35 S.E.2d 801 (1945) ; 1 S. WiLLISTON,
SA.ES § 243 (rev. ed. 1948).
7. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931).
8. Nemeth v. Becker Roofing Co., 151 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941).
9. For a collection of cases see, 46 Am. JUR. SALES § 333 (1943) ; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 317b
(1952).
10. As early as 1914 it was held that a disclaimer would not be enforced because the
layman could not comprehend its consequences. In refusing to enforce a standard automobile
disclaimer, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated that:
[TIhe language of the stipulation is extremely technical, "This express warranty ex-
cludes all implied warranties;" its meaning is clear to but few persons. Int'l Har-
vester Co. of America v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 847, 169 S.W. 549, 551 (1914). Accord,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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injuries" or that if one defective part causes the destruction of the entire
car the manufacturer is obligated only to replace the defective part.
12
Other courts have refused to enforce purported disclaimers because
they were drafted so as to purposely escape the average buyer's atten-
tion.' Many disclaimers are incorporated by a vague reference and are
never seen by the purchaser until after he has bought the product. 4
Others are hidden in paragraphs of fine print on the back of one of the
pages of a long standard form contract.'
Lastly, many courts have used the "displacement theory" to circum-
vent purported disclaimers. These courts deny implied warranty recovery
only when the same area is covered by the express warranty, which they
view as displacing a coexistent implied warranty. Hence, they view a
limited express parts warranty as not in conflict with general im-
plied warranties and, absent a specific disclaimer clause in the express
parts warranty, allow recovery for consequential property and personal
damages.' 6
However, in spite of the foregoing assaults upon the bastion of the
disclaimer, many courts still give full effect to them if they are drafted
in an iron-clad manner. For example, a clear majority of recent decisions
have upheld the standard automobile warranty and disclaimer.' There
11. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated of the standard automobile warranty:
[I]n the context of this warranty, only the abandonment of all sense of justice would
permit us to hold that, as a matter of law, the phrase "its obligation under this war-
ranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof" signifies
to an ordinary reasonable person that he is relinquishing any personal injury claim
that might flow from the use of a defective automobile. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 388, 161 A.2d 69, 93 (1960).
12. In an express warranty action where a defective dashboard part almost totally de-
stroyed a new automobile, the court held that the only obligation of the manufacturer under
the contract was to give the now car-less buyer a new dashboard part. Norway v. Root, 58
Wash. 2d 96, 361 P.2d 162 (1961).
13. Celanese Corp. of America v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954)
Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Admiral Oasis Hotel
Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965) ; Turner v. Kunde,
256 Iowa 835, 128 N.W.2d 196 (1964) ; Black v. B.B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155
S.E. 268 (1930); Calumet Cheese Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 25 Wisc. 2d 55, 130 N.W.2d 290
(1964).
14. The warranty and disclaimer in Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1962) was incorporated by reference and was in the glove compartment of the automo-
bile. Brief for Appellant at 11, Id.
15. The disclaimer in Henningsen was in the middle of about eight and one-half inches
of fine print on the back of one of the pages. It was not set off in any manner. Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 365, 161 A.2d 69, 74 (1960).
16. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.
1964) ; Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Corp., 138 So.2d 777 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962). For
a collection of cases see, 77 C.J.S. Sales § 316b n.95 (1952).
17. The standard automobile warranty and disclaimer has been given full force and
effect in, Min-O-Con Equip. Corp. v. T.M.K. Constr. Co., - Ariz. -, 424 P.2d 152
(1967) ; Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 1225, 397 P.2d 881 (1965) ; Brown v. Chrysler Corp.,
112 Ga. App. 22, 143 S.E.2d 575 (1965); Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky.
1966) (U.C.C. case); Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960);
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is, however, a growing trend to avoid the effect of a disclaimer of implied
warranties by allowing recovery on the theory of strict tort liability.',
The Florida decisions dealing with disclaimers seem to hinge upon
an application of the aforementioned "displacement theory." In a case
in which the purported disclaimer contained only an express parts war-
ranty and an integration clause, the First District Court of Appeal al-
lowed recovery on an implied warranty because its implication was not
in conflict with the limited express warranty.'9 However, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal refused to allow recovery under similar circum-
stances because the limited express parts warranty was given "in lieu of
all other warranties, express or implied."2° Both cases applied the dis-
placement theory, the only distinction being that in one case the pur-
ported disclaimer displaced all other warranties while the other one did
not contain this proviso.2'
The decision in the instant case also seemed to rest upon the dis-
placement theory.22 The court quoted at length from Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Industrial Supply Corp.,2" and Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.24 Both of
these cases rested upon the displacement theory.25 What is perplexing,
however, is that the displacement theory theoretically applies only where
the limited express warranty is not given "in lieu of all other war-
Lilly v. Manning Motor Co., 262 N.C. 468, 137 S.E.2d 847 (1964); Knecht v. Uni-
versal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1962) ; Norton Buick v. E.W. Tone Co., 351 P.2d
731 (Okla. 1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Puskar, 394 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Wil-
liams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964). Contra, Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. App. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (strict tort
liability case) ; Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966)
(strict tort liability case) ; State Farm Mut. Life Ins. Co., v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252
Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960) ; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
18. For a collection of cases adopting this theory see, CCH PROD. LIAB. RPTR. 4070
(1966).
19. Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Corp., 138 So.2d 777 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
20. Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). This decision was the
basis of the per curiam affirmance in the instant case.
21. This distinction between those purported disclaimers which do not expressly exclude
all other implied warranties and those which do was noted by Judge Balaban when he de-
nied a motion for summary judgment in an implied warranty action, and noted in part:
[T]he express warranty minus the modification provision is not inconsistent with
the implied warranty. Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equipment Company, 138 So.2d
777, 780 (Fla. App. 1962). Cf. Rozen v. Chrysler Corporation, 142 So.2d 735 (Fla.
App. 1962) reh. den., where an express warranty was given in lieu of all other war-
ranties. Laurent v. Honda, Inc., 27 Fla. Supp. 183, 187 (Cir. Ct. Dade Co. 1967).
22. This writer uses the term "seemed" because the court did not expressly state why
they felt the disclaimer ineffective. After a vague phrase which stated that neither lack of
privity nor the disclaimer immunized the manufacturer, the court simply listed a series of
case quotations in random order.
23. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Florida products liability law).
24. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
25. Neither of these cases contained a purported disclaimer which gave a limited express
parts warranty "in lieu of all other warranties express or implied." In both cases the court
simply found that the asserted implied warranty was not inconsistent with the limited express
parts warranty.
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ranties."28 Yet, despite the fact that the purported disclaimer in the
instant case did contain just such a disclaimer clause 27 the court gave
no explanation as to why implying a warranty was not inconsistent
with a contractual provision which stated that no warranties were im-
plied.28 However, notwithstanding the court's reasoning, it seems clear
that Florida is now committed to a policy of protecting the consumer
from disclaimers inserted by the manufacturer. Few people can quibble
with this result.
The exact scope of the holding in the instant case is clouded by the
now applicable Uniform Commercial Code.29 It should be emphasized
that in the instant case the court did not recognize the effectiveness of
the disclaimer and then strike it, but rather it simply stated that the
disclaimer was ineffective. Under the U.C.C. this does not become a dis-
tinction without a difference. The U.C.C. contains a section which spe-
cifically grants a seller the right to effectively disclaim warranties and
even maps out the formula to be used."°
This writer sees two available alternatives open to the Florida courts
to achieve the result in the instant case under the U.C.C. The first alter-
native would be to adopt a forthright approach and declare disclaimers
contrary to public policy and hence subject to being stricken by the
courts." The U.C.C. allows for this in a section whicfi gives a court the
26. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964). The
purported disclaimer in Sperry Rand contained an express parts warranty and an integration
clause, but no specific disclaimer clause. The court noted that:
[Ilt is strongly and plausibly argued by Sperry Rand that the integration clause,
so-called of the sales contract precludes any recovery by Industrial Supply on an
implied warranty. If the general clause had expressly provided that there were no
implied warranties the position of Sperry Rand would be sound. Id. at 371.
This point is further emphasized by American Can Co. v. Horolamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730
(5th Cir. 1965). In this contemporaneous decision, the same court which decided Sperry Rand
applied the same Florida products liability law and gave full effect to a purported disclaimer
which contained a specific disclaimer clause.
27. 201 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1967).
28. In the instant case the court failed to comment upon their prior holding in Stein-
hardt v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920) wherein it was stated that,
"... there will be no implication of warranty in conflict with the express terms of the agree-
ment." Id. at 535, 86 So. at 432.
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 671-680 (1965).
The U.C.C. allows for a use of the displacement theory, in cases not involving a specific
disclaimer clause, with one exception. FLA. STAT. -§ 672.2-317 (1965) provides that express
warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose (set forth in § 672.2-315). However, another section of the U.C.C.,
discussed infra, applies when a specific disclaimer clause is in the contract.
30. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-316(2) (1965) provides:
• .. to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it
the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspic-
uous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must
be by a writing and conspicuous.
31. ". . . we are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising therefrom is so inimical to the public
good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 390, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
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power to strike a contract provision which it finds to be "unconscion-
able.""2 The second alternative would be for the courts to allow recovery
based upon strict tort liability." This cause of action is independent of
implied warranty liability and cannot be disclaimed.-4
With the decision in the instant case, Florida seems to have now
given full recognition to Lord Ellenborough's cogent statement. No longer
will a manufacturer immunize itself from liability by inserting a vague
phrase in a contract of sale. Henceforth, the only "lemons" Florida
consumers must accept will be the agricultural variety.
RONALD WM. SABO
LEVY AND SALE UNDER JUDGMENT EXECUTION ON
STOCK IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
CORPORATIONS
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the sale of their stock in a profes-
sional service corporation to satisfy a judgment against them individually.
The chancellor permanently enjoined the sale of the stock on the basis of
Florida Statutes, sections 621.09 and 621.11.1 The Third District Court
32. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-302 (1965). However, it has not yet been held by any decision
which this writer is aware of, that a court may use this section to void a disclaimer which
meets the requirements set forth in the U.C.C. At least one legal writer has taken the posi-
tion that such a valid disclaimer cannot be struck by the courts:
[lilt appears to be a matter of common assumption that section 2-302 is applicable
to warranty disclaimers. I find this frankly, incredible. Here is 2-316 which sets
forth clear, specific and anything but easy-to-meet standards for disclaiming war-
ranties. It is a highly detailed section, the comments to which disclose full awareness
of the problems at hand. It contains no reference of any kind to section 2-302, al-
though nine other sections of article 2 contain such references. In such circumstances
the usually bland assumptions that a disclaimer which meets the requirements of
2-316 might still be strikable as "unconscionable" under 2-302 seems explainable if
at all, as oversight, wishful thinking or (in a rare case) attempted sneakiness. (foot-
notes omitted)
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 523 (1967).
At least one court has inferentially taken the same view. Chronologically, the case was similar
to the instant one in that the U.C.C. was not in effect when the cause of action arose, but it
was when the case was decided. There the court refused to strike the disclaimer as contrary to
public policy because they felt the legislature had established public policy when it adopted
the U.C.C. which specifically declared that warranties may be disclaimed. Murray v. Marshall
Oldsmobile, Inc., - Va. -, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967).
33. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer ....
34. Id., comment m at 355.
1. No corporation organized under the provisions of this act may issue any of its
capital stock to anyone other than an individual who is duly licensed or otherwise
legally authorized to render the same specific professional services as those for which
the corporation was incorporated.
FLA. STAT. § 621.09 (1965).
No shareholder of a corporation organized under this act may sell or transfer his
